


Exploiting the Linux Dynamic Loader with LD_PRELOAD

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The Executable and linking format (ELF)



linkers

loaders

libraries

Linkers

*combine compiled code fragments into single
memory-loadable executable*

```
$ ld obj1.o obj2.o -o linked.o
```

symbol resolution

program components reference each other through symbols (ELF .symtab)

Relocation

adjustment of code/data sections
(also performed by the loader)

Loaders

copy code and data into memory

memory allocation/mapping

relocation

Also performed by the linker

execve()

Libraries

collections of reusable compiled code

statically-linked

*dynamically-linked (shared)**


*historically: a shared library was something else entirely

Statically-linked libraries

code copied into final binary

be aware of: cyclic dependencies, multiple symbol definitions

```
$ld obj1.o obj2.o /usr/lib/libname.a
```



Dynamically-linked libraries


dynamic loader (ld.so) resolves symbols at exectime

can be called from within the application at runtime

By linking ld and calling dlopen(), etc.

Process:

- execve() loads executable code into memory
- control is passed to the dynamic linker (ld.so) which maps shared objects to program address space (resolves symbols)
- control is then passed to the application



So what is LD_PRELOAD?

environment var queried by dynamic linker on exec

allows dynamic linker to prioritize linking defined shared libs

```
$ LD_PRELOAD="./mylib.so" ./myexec
```


Attack enablers

OS 'features'

*weak **system** security*

*good **coding** practices*

*goto **general_rule**;*

general_rule:

***good_for_devs** == **good_for_hackers**;*

Attack advantages

easy, effective on *unprotected* systems

code *interception*

code *injection*

program *flow manipulation*

debugging using *wrapper functions*

Attack disadvantages

can be *protected* against

requires *access* to executable

requires relevant *privileges*

works on *used, imported symbols*

Example 1 – Hello World

```
$ nm -D hello
```

Undefined symbol

```
w __gmon_start__  
U __libc_start_main  
U printf
```

```
$ nm -D make_goodbye.so
```

```
0000000000000069c T printf
```

Symbol exists in .text

```
U stdout  
U vfprintf
```

Example 1 – Hello World – cont.

NORMAL SYMBOL RESOLUTION:



REDIRECTED SYMBOL RESOLUTION:



*in practice it works slightly differently – this is just a conceptual explanation

Example 2 – OpenSSH MITM

dynamically links openssl

checks public key against known_hosts with BN_cmp()

BN_cmp() must pass (== 0) for iterations 3 and 5

Example 3 – OpenSSH password logger

catch write() w/ string literal "s password"

log read()s until '\n'

Example 4 – Extending ‘cat’ functionality

intercept `__snprintf_check()` to add to `usage()`

wrap `getopt_long()` to catch new command line option

catch `write()`, `vfork()` and launch browser for each link

./preloader

*tool that does *some* of the work for you*

provides reusable library of function sigs

reduces repetitive tasks

(sorry about the code quality!)

<http://www.github.com/2of1/preloader>

Further reading

Reverse Engineering with LD_PRELOAD (Itzik Kotler)

<http://securityvulns.com/articles/reveng/>

Linkers and Loaders (Sandeep Grover)

<http://www.linuxjournal.com/article/6463>

Dynamic Linker (Wikipedia)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dynamic_linker

man ld.so

Final thoughts

Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a thousand battles without

Sun Wu Tzu, The Art of War

“There is no right and wrong. There’s only fun and boring”

The Plague, Hackers 1995